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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate a model of housing demand with neighborhood eﬀects. We exploit
special features of the National sample of the American Housing Survey and properties of housing
markets that allow us to create “natural” instruments and therefore identify the impact of social
interactions. We ﬁnd evidence of both endogenous and contextual neighborhood eﬀects. We report
two alternative sets of estimates for neighborhood eﬀects that diﬀer in terms of the instruments
we use for estimating the model. When the endogenous neighborhood eﬀect is large the respective
contextual eﬀects are weak, and vice versa. The elasticity of housing demand with respect to the
mean of the neighbors’ housing demands (the endogenous eﬀect) ranges from 0.19 to 0.66 and is
generally very signiﬁcant. The contextual eﬀects are also very signiﬁcant. A key such eﬀect, the
elasticity with respect to the mean of neighbors’ permanent incomes ranges from 0.17 to 0.54.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: R21, C31.
Keywords: Housing demand, endogenous neighborhood eﬀects, social interactions.
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brookin6918.tex1 Introduction
The increase in income equality in the 1990s has led to a new focus on measuring the impact of
social eﬀects on economic behavior. This rise is due, in part, to the belief that the rich beneﬁt
from a better social environment more than do poorer individuals. It is natural to expect that
such social eﬀects originate in one’s place of residence and are often referred to as neighborhood
eﬀects. The impact of neighborhood on economic behavior can manifest itself through numerous
channels. First, one’s behavior can be inﬂuenced by the behavior or the characteristics of one’s
neighbors. Schelling (1978) has changed our thinking in this context. Desirable social interactions
and beneﬁcial local community “social capital” are known to be attractive features of diﬀerent
communities. Second, one can be aﬀected by the public services that the town provides such as
school quality and security. Third, one can be impacted by locally undesirable land uses such as
toxic waste sites, incinerators, or electricity generating plants. The decision about where to locate
and how much housing to consume will be inﬂuenced by these and other related factors.
In this paper, we derive and estimate a model of housing demand that incorporates social eﬀects
that originate in one’s residential neighborhood. Such social eﬀects will be referred to as neigh-
borhood eﬀects from now on. They include individuals’ valuing the socioeconomic characteristics
of their neighbors and their consumption of housing, which in turn show up as determinants of
individual housing demand. Following a standard typology due to Manski (1993), they may be
classiﬁed as contextual and endogenous neighborhood eﬀects, respectively. The endogenous eﬀect
expresses a notion of “keeping up with the Joneses,” whereby individuals who view their neighbors’
decisions to maintain, renovate, repair, or make additions to their houses will strive to keep up
by making similar decisions and hence increase their own housing consumption. The contextual
eﬀect will arise when owners view their neighbors’ characteristics, e.g. income, as a signal of their
future housing consumption and thus alter their own consumption accordingly. To our knowledge,
no other researchers have estimated a model of housing demand with neighborhood eﬀects.
Such social eﬀects can result in reinforcing behavior that may lead to a divergence in quality
across neighborhoods. That is, decisions to maintain, renovate, repair, or make additions to
houses will lead other neighbors to do the same and to increasingly higher quality neighborhoods
compared to those where these decisions are not undertaken. The higher quality neighborhoods
1will foster increased access to social capital that provides its residents with more opportunities for
socioeconomic success. This will increase the (economic) gap between those individuals in the
good and bad neighborhoods.
This paper treats the model of housing demand for a group of neighbors as a system of si-
multaneous equations. This approach follows Moﬃtt (2001) and helps clarify the identiﬁcation
conditions for neighborhood eﬀects ﬁrst articulated by Manski, op. cit.. These conditions have
been developed further and generalized by Brock and Durlauf (2000). The endogenous variables
in the system of equations are the set of individual housing demands in each neighborhood. We
provide natural instruments for these variables by exploiting the intuition of the hedonic approach
to the determination of house prices. The hedonic house price equation includes variables that our
theory suggests that should be excluded from the demand equations. This identiﬁes the system.
We estimate our model using micro data from suitably chosen subsamples of the national sample
of the American Housing Survey (AHS). These subsamples include information on dwelling units
and their occupants and on those of some of their nearest (in a geographical sense) neighbors, and
together constitute about one-tenth of the data. This feature allows us to use this part of the data
as a source of contextual information, and it is a key advantage of the AHS data. The remainder
of the data are used for estimating the house price index that is included in the demand equation.
This constitutes an important aspect of our approach. For speciﬁc applications, house price indices
can be hard to deﬁne and calculate and their availability often determines the quality of housing
research.
Our empirical analysis follows a four-step process that involves estimating the price of hous-
ing services, permanent income, the predicted value of the mean of neighbors’ housing demands,
and ﬁnally the structural housing demand equation. We ﬁrst estimate a reduced-form version of
the housing demand equation to show the existence of neighborhood eﬀects without distinguish-
ing between contextual and endogenous eﬀects. Estimation of the structural model allows us to
decompose these eﬀects into endogenous and contextual eﬀects. We use two alternative sets of
instruments to identify the model. These are, ﬁrst, the means of the structural characteristics of
the neighbors’ houses, and second, those of a single (randomly chosen) neighbor. We justify the use
of these instruments through the link to the hedonic theory of house prices and also test for their
2exogeneity using a standard test for over-identiﬁcation. The results support the presence of both
endogenous and contextual eﬀects. The elasticity of housing demand with respect to the mean of
the neighbors’ housing demands, the endogenous eﬀect, ranges from 0.19 to 0.66. The elasticity
with respect to the mean of neighbors’ permanent income, a contextual eﬀect, ranges from 0.17 to
0.54.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data and provide summary
statistics of the relevant variables. In Section 3 we derive the model of housing demand with
neighborhood eﬀects. The empirical results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 The AHS Data
We start with a discussion the data, because its special features motivate our approach and some
of our estimation procedure. The main data source used for this study is the national version of
the American Housing Survey (NAHS). The NAHS is an unbalanced panel of more than 50,000
housing units that are interviewed every two years. It serves as the basis for US housing statistics.
The NAHS contains detailed information on dwelling units and their occupants houses through
time. The information includes the current owner’s evaluation of the unit’s market value, various
structural characteristics of dwelling units, and self-reported information on the house’s current
occupants. Since the mid 1980s, the NAHS is conducted every two years.
In 1985, 630 dwelling units, which will be referred to as kernels in the remainder of the paper,
were selected at random, and up to ten nearest housing units, to be referred to together with
the kernel as neighborhood clusters, were interviewed. Additional observations come from larger
clusters, making the total number of clusters equal to 680, yielding a data set of 7,350 housing
units. This was repeated in 1989, when 769 kernel units were selected, and in 1993, when 1018
kernel units were selected. Additional units in existing clusters were included in 1989 to reﬂect
additional units that had been added within the perimeter of the 1985 “neighborhood.” By 1993,
a maximum of 20 neighboring units were allowed per cluster. 1 The result is an unbalanced
three-wave panel of dwelling units. Tables 1–5 provide extensive details on the structure of the
data, including observation counts on new clusters, new households and new units, etc., and their
1We are grateful to Barbara T. Williams, US Bureau of the Census, for this clariﬁcation.
3geographic distribution.
By working with this special subsample of the NAHS, we generate a data set that includes
information on the value and characteristics for all dwelling units in the cluster. The owner-
occupant’s characteristics that we work with include, in particular, the owner’s years of schooling,
whether the owner is white, whether the owner is married, the number of persons in the household,
household income, and whether the house has changed hands in the last ﬁve years.
For each survey, owners are asked to estimate how much their property (and, in addition, its
lot, if appropriate) would sell for if it were for sale. Goodman and Ittner (1992) and Kiel and
Zabel (1999) ﬁnd that while, on average, owners over-estimate their value by 5%, this bias is not
systematically related to the observed characteristics of the owner, house, or neighborhood. Kiel
and Zabel ﬁnd that the overvaluation is greatest for new owners and declines with length of tenure.
They recommend that length of tenure be included in the house price hedonic when using the AHS
data.
An observation on a dwelling unit from the AHS is included in our sample only if it: is associated
with a regular occupied interview, is owner occupied, lies in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA),
is valued by the owner to be worth at least $10,000, and is not missing any information on the unit’s
or occupant’s characteristics that are included in our analysis. Since we are using the information
about the neighbors to measure neighborhood eﬀects, we require that there are at least four other
dwelling units in the cluster after the above selection criteria have been employed. This reduces
the number of observations for 1985, 1989, and 1993 to, respectively, 1947, 2318, and 2909.
Of the 365 neighborhood clusters included in our analysis, 196 are present in all three years.
These clusters are located in 100 MSAs. Full information on the distribution of clusters across the
three years is given in Tables 1–5. The names and deﬁnitions of the variables used in this study are
given in Table 6. The means and standard deviations for these variables by year and for all three
years combined are given in Table 7.
3 The Neighborhood Model
We study housing demand by treating each neighborhood cluster as a group of interacting agents. A
cluster’s kernel is randomly selected within the MSA and all neighborhood-speciﬁc interactions are
4construed as conditional on the speciﬁc cluster to which a dwelling unit belongs. Under the Nash
equilibrium assumption, an individual takes her neighbors’ decisions as given. An individual’s
presence in a cluster implies dependence on her neighbors’ housing consumption decisions and
their observable individual characteristics. For example, Ioannides (2001b) documents a range
of correlation coeﬃcients among neighbors’ income from 0.3 to 0.5, depending upon year and
geographic location within the United States. Neighbors may act on information about one another
which is not directly observable by the econometrician. Some of these variables may be correlated
with observable characteristics because of cluster-speciﬁc housing market clearing may sort similar
people to similar neighborhoods. For the purpose of this paper, characteristics of neighbors that
aﬀect housing demand and are measured at the cluster level are treated as sources of contextual
eﬀects, while neighbors’ housing consumption decisions are treated as sources of endogenous social
eﬀects, where we have invoked the terminology of Manski (1993).2 These labels are clariﬁed further
by the behavioral model to which we turn next.
3.1 The Behavioral Model
An individual h cares about the quantity of housing services, yh; produced by her property i with
structural characteristics qi in cluster ·; whose attributes are denoted by x·: Let an individual’s
utility function depend on composite nonhousing consumption, ch; consumption of housing ser-
vices, yh; own demographic characteristics that might aﬀect preferences, zh; the vectors of housing
consumptions in the neighborhood, yn(i),3 and on the observable socioeconomic characteristics of
neighbors, zn(i) :
Uh = U(ch;yh;zh;yn(i);zn(i)): (1)
We assume that the utility function Uh(¢) is increasing and quasi-concave with respect to (ch;yh):
We also assume that it depends on one’s neighbors’ housing consumption and on their socioeconomic
2In a follow-up study [ Ioannides and Zabel (2000) ], we also attempt to separately identify correlated eﬀects,
that is, an individual’s tendency to behave like others with similar unobservable characteristics. This requires that
we look at neighborhood choice. This, in turn, necessitates that we distinguish between residential neighborhood
interactions, which are analyzed at the cluster level and require conditioning on the characteristics of a small group
of individuals with possibly correlated characteristics, and community interactions which require conditioning on the
characteristics of a population, such as that of a census tract, which individuals take as given. For the purpose of
the present paper, we have not linked neighborhood clusters with census tracts. This could be accomplished only by
access to privileged information. Indeed, Ioannides and Zabel (2000) is based on such information. In the present
paper, we may condition only on cluster-speciﬁc variables.
3Preferences may depend directly upon the consumption of others, as in the formalization of Pollak (1976).
5characteristics, which are expressed in vector form as (yn(i);zn(i)): Nothing in the theory suggests
a priori a speciﬁc functional dependence of U on (yn(i);zn(i)): Assuming a static-equivalent setting,
individual h chooses how to allocate her permanent income Ih to nonhousing consumption, ch; and
housing consumption, yh; subject to
ch + pyh = Ih; (2)
where nonhousing consumption is the numeraire and p is the price of housing services. Neighbors’
consumption and socioeconomic characteristics are taken by individual h as given, as neighborhood
choice is given.
Maximization of (1) with respect to nonhousing and housing consumption, subject to (2), yields







Solving equations (2) and (3) yields the optimal consumption of housing services, housing demand.
This is all standard except for the presence of social interactions, represented here by an individual’s
utility being a function of (yn(i);zn(i)): Unless nonhousing and housing consumption, (ch;yh), and
the remaining arguments of the utility function (zh;yn(i);zn(i)) enter separably, the marginal rate
of substitution between housing and nonhousing consumption includes, in general, the full set of
variables (ch;yh;zh;yn(i);zn(i)): Therefore, housing demand in general would reﬂect dependence
on own demographic characteristics, housing consumption among neighbors and socioeconomic
characteristics of neighbors, (zh;Ih;yn(i);zn(i)); in addition to price and income. We suppress the
dependence of housing consumption on the actual unit and the cluster in which it lies, (i;·); unless
it is necessary for clarity.
Of particular interest in the context of social interactions is whether the utility function (1)
depends on actual or on expected housing consumption among neighbors. We assume the former and
therefore the demand functions that emanate from our model will contain a spatial autoregressive
component. We justify this as follows. As Manski (1993) notes,4 the spatial autoregressive model
“implies that the sample members know who each other are and choose their outcomes only after
4“Thus, the spatial correlation model assumes that an endogenous eﬀect is present within the researcher’s sample
rather than within the population from which the sample is drawn. This makes sense in studies of small-group
interactions, where the sample is composed of clusters of friends, co-workers, or household members;” [ Manski, op.
cit., , p. 537. ]
6having been selected into the sample” [ Manski, op. cit., , p. 537 ]. We assume that individuals
react when neighbors increase their housing consumption through maintenance, addition, alteration,
and/or repair to their housing structures by changing their own consumption in a similar fashion.
Thus, we would like to know what happens when individuals observe their neighbors increasing
their housing consumption. We would like to test what the simple notion of “keeping up with the
Joneses” suggests, namely that they feel pressure to keep up with their neighbors and increase their
own housing consumption.
We deﬁne the quantity of housing services as a scalar measure of the ﬂow of services that arise
from the structure and the neighborhood in which the house is located. This approach to housing
demand has been used extensively in the literature and is useful for calculating price and income
elasticities of housing demand; see Zabel (2001) and references therein. While there is also a large
literature devoted to the demand for housing as derived from the demand for particular housing
characteristics, we ﬁnd that the use of housing services as a scalar quantity allows us to measure
better the social interactions that we are trying to capture by our model of housing demand.
That is, the social interactions reﬂect the impact on individuals’ overall housing consumption of
an increase in their neighbors’ housing consumption via maintenance, addition, alteration, and/or
repair of the housing structure.
The quantity of housing services is equal to the value of these services divided by the price per
unit of service. Since the value of a house is the present discounted value of the stream of services
provided by that house, the annualized value of these services is r ¢ Wi· where r is the user cost of
housing and Wi· the value of unit i in cluster ·. Thus, we deﬁne the quantity of housing services
consumed by individual h who occupies unit i in cluster · as the ratio of housing expenditure,
deﬁned as the annualized value of her property, r ¢ Wi·; divided by price, p·: It is convenient to
express this deﬁnition in logs:
`nyi·h = `nWi· ¡ `np·: (4)
Note that we have suppressed the term lnr from this equation since it will be subsumed in the
constant term in the housing demand equation. Thus, because we work with logs, we need not
make any assumptions about the rate at which properties produce the ﬂow of housing services.5
5Because of the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in the US, the user cost may be deﬁned as net of tax.
We refrain from doing so in this paper. However, one of the variables that we control for in estimating the price of
7Given a particular speciﬁcation of the utility function in (1), it is possible to derive the housing
demand equation by solving the ﬁrst-order condition (3) along with the budget constraint (2).
Instead, we follow much of the literature by approximating the housing demand function using a
log-linear speciﬁcation:
`nyi·h = ® + ¹`np· + »`nzh + ±`nIh + ¯Πy(`nyn(i)) + °Πz(zn(i)) + v· + ²·h; (5)
where ®;¹;»;± are scalar and ¯ and ° vectors of parameters to be estimated, v· is an unobservable
cluster random eﬀect and, ²·h is an unobservable random variable that is assumed to be inde-
pendently and identically distributed over all observations. This model combines features of Case
(1991; 1992) and of the spatial model in Manski (1993), p. 537, Equ. 7, which we discuss above. It
diﬀers from the principal model in the latter in that in (5), social interactions work through actual
behavior, `nyn(i); instead of the expected behavior of her neighbors. Unlike the main model in
Manski (1993), there is no need to solve for the expectation of endogenous variables, because they
are not present as explanatory variables. Furthermore, if we had speciﬁed the model in terms of the
expected consumption of one’s neighbors, then it would be necessary to use the full set of equations
for all neighbors as a system of simultaneous equations to solve for the expectations, in the style of
Moﬃtt, op. cit.. A straightforward consequence of our modelling choice would be that all neigh-
bors’ socioeconomic characteristics would show up in the reduced forms for the expectation. Their
presence there should not, of course, be taken to imply evidence that they constitute contextual
eﬀects. Such a presence would simply follow from the logic of the simultaneous estimation system.
We now link our terminology with that used by the literature. The term ¯Πy(`nyn(i)) on the
RHS of (5) denotes a function of neighbors’ incomes. It reﬂects an endogenous social eﬀect. Such a
social eﬀect is, of course, central to the notion of neighborhood eﬀects: a person’s behavior depends
on the actual behavior of her neighbors, rather than the expected behavior of the population from
which the sample is drawn. For example, when one’s neighbors maintain their property, one keeps
up with them. The term °Πz(zn(i)) denotes a function of neighbors’ characteristics. It expresses a
contextual eﬀect, an exogenous social eﬀect which gives the eﬀect of the neighbors’ characteristics
of potential interest, like racial and ethnic composition, income levels, and educational attainment.
An individual’s demand for housing reﬂects her neighbors’ characteristics as a matter of taste.
housing is the property tax rate. See section 3.2 below.
8However, this could be a proxy for an individual’s expectations of the future development of the
neighborhood. The term »`nzh reﬂects the direct eﬀect of occupants’ own characteristics upon
housing expenditure, again as a matter of taste. However, income is handled separately by ±`nIh: In
contrast, the term °Πz`nzn(i) reﬂects the impact of the neighbors’ characteristics. Such dependence
follows as an outcome of sorting features of the matching process of households with dwelling units,
whereby individuals’ interest in the socioeconomic proﬁle of their neighborhood is mediated in the
residential matching process. 6
Were it not for the terms ¯Πy(`nyn(i)) and °Πz(zn(i)) in the demand equation, our approach
would be entirely conventional. Also, any theory that encompasses this model would not necessarily
imply that the dependence of an individual’s demand upon those of her neighbors is through a
loglinear function of yn(i) and of zn(i): Obviously, it could be more general. Of particular interest
are such extreme cases as social eﬀects being a function of the maximum or minimum income, or of
housing consumption, or more generally of their distribution within an individual’s neighborhood.
We plan to deal with such extensions in our follow-up study, Ioannides and Zabel, op. cit., that
incorporates neighborhood choice.
The analytical consequence of imposing Nash equilibrium within the neighborhood requires con-
sidering a simultaneous equations system along the lines of (5) for all owner-occupants of dwelling
units in each neighborhood cluster ·; to which unit i belongs. For numerous reasons, including
missing data and varying numbers of owners in clusters, the number of units in each cluster in the
data can vary across clusters, and the number of equations in each simultaneous system will diﬀer
across clusters. This is a complication which is avoided by our use of average values among one’s
neighbors, which are much simpler to compute irrespective of varying neighborhood cluster sizes
across the data.
It is important to clarify that ours is the ﬁrst study that allows for endogenous neighborhood
eﬀects in a housing demand model with a properly speciﬁed price. Ioannides (2000) and Kiel
and Zabel (1998) have estimated models of housing decisions using American Housing Survey data
along with clusters data for 1985, 1989, and 1993. Ioannides emphasizes the simultaneity of property
valuations in a model where an individual’s valuation of a dwelling unit is related to its valuation
6We ignore this aspect of the model in the present paper, in that it would require a model of neighborhood choice.
We address this issue in Ioannides and Zabel (2000).
9in the previous wave and to those of the neighboring units within clusters, in addition to a unit’s
own characteristics and to those of its neighbors in the cluster. Because of conditioning on the
lagged value of the endogenous variable, his model may be referred to as a pseudo demand model.
Kiel and Zabel carry out hedonic house price regressions where in addition to characteristics of
individual units they use characteristics of the clusters and of the census tracts within which the
units in the sample lie, but do not attempt to estimate a demand model as such. Ioannides (2001a)
estimates a model of neighborhood eﬀects in maintenance decisions.
3.2 The Price of Housing Services
Estimation of the housing demand equation requires knowledge of the price of housing, p·. Note
that p· appears (implicitly) on the LHS of equation (5) as well as on the RHS as a regressor. Once
a measure of p· is available, we can calculate housing services using equation (4). A number of
methods have been used to obtain the price of housing services. We follow the common approach
of estimating the hedonic house price function. This results in an index of the relative value of a
”constant quality” house for diﬀerent housing markets.
The operation of the housing market may be visualized as a process of bidding7 for diﬀerent
housing units and packages of neighborhood amenities by diﬀerent individuals, so that the maxi-
mum valuations of each set of characteristics prevail as prices. Housing units, on the other hand,
are produced by proﬁt seeking entrepreneurs, and therefore cost considerations enter through the
supply side and make values of houses be a function of the structural and other characteristics,
qi; including characteristics of the neighborhood, x·; where i indexes dwelling units and · indexes
neighborhood clusters. Invoking standard hedonic theory of housing markets [ Rosen (1974) ], we
postulate that the relationship between housing values and housing and neighborhood characteris-
tics, W(qi;x·;yn(i);zn(i)); may be estimated if suitable data are available.8
7This is a standard concept with a vast literature. See also Ellickson (1981) and Lerman and Kern (1983), who
link explicitly the deﬁnition of house price hedonics with bidding models of housing markets.
8Formally, the hedonic function may be visualized as the outer envelope of the individual expenditure functions
where diﬀerent expenditure functions are parameterized by income. To see this, let housing services be produced from
structural characteristics and neighborhood characteristics, (qi;xj·;yn(i);zn(i)); by means of a household production
function. Therefore, the expenditure function for housing, Vi·h = V (qi;x·;yn(i);zn(i);u;Ih) may be deﬁned as
U(Ih ¡ Vi·h;qi;x·;yn(i);zn(i)) = u;
Vi·h is the amount an individual is willing to pay for diﬀerent values of housing and neighborhood characteristics,
given a ﬁxed level of utility, u, and conditional on a given choice of neighborhood with socioeconomic characteristics
10In accordance with the above discussion, we specify a log-linear hedonic house price function
`nWi· = a0 + a1`nqi + a2`nx· + ayΠy`nyn(i) + azΠz`nzn(i) + ui·; (6)
where: the intercept a0 absorbs the user cost, the parameters a1;a2;ay;az are the marginal val-
uations of the respective characteristics, which may be estimated; Πy and Πz denote proximity
matrices that deﬁne the relevant neighborhood for each unit and attribute an eﬀect from the neigh-
borhood n(i) to the individual unit i; and ui· denotes an unobserved random variable. As discussed
above, the terms Πy`nyn(i) and Πz`nzn(i) can be simpliﬁed to express dependence of housing val-
ues on the average housing consumption and the average socioeconomic characteristics among the
members of the neighborhood cluster [ see Ioannides (2000) ]. We note that the presence of both
unit and neighborhood characteristics, (qi;x·); and of the characteristics of neighbors (yn(i);zn(i));
simply reﬂect the role of the latter as neighborhood amenities and therefore contextual eﬀects. We
emphasize that the characteristics of a unit’s own occupant do not enter as determinants of a unit’s
value. It is those of the neighbors that do.
In order to obtain estimates of the price of housing services, we extend Equ. (6) to multiple





a0jMSAij+a1`nqij+a2`nx·j+ayjΠy`nyn(i)+azjΠz`nzn(i)+ui·j; i = 1;:::;Nj;j = 1;:::;J;
(7)
where i indexes dwelling units; j indexes MSAs; Nj is the number of observations in MSA j; MSAij
is dummy variable, which is equal to 1, for all units in MSA j; and to zero, otherwise; and the ®0j’s
are the MSA-speciﬁc intercepts which we interpret as housing price index values. By leaving MSA
J out of the equation, all other prices are interpreted as relative to MSA J: It is these MSA-speciﬁc
numbers, the f®01;:::;®0Jg
0 s; that we use as an instrument for prices, the p·’s, that appears on
the RHS of the demand Equ. (5) and on the RHS of Equ. (4) that deﬁnes housing services.











That is, the optimal expenditure V is identiﬁed with the house price hedonic function, deﬁned in (6) below.
9See Mills and Simenauer (1996) for a related application in housing markets.
11Note that it is important to include all observable determinants of housing in the house price
hedonic, Equ. (7), for two reasons. First, regardless of the factors one wishes to account for in
the house price index, it is necessary to include all observable determinants of house prices in (7)
in order to obtain the most accurate estimates of the parameters in this equation. Second, since
we wish to construct a housing price index for metropolitan areas of the U.S., it is important to
compare a standard dwelling unit across diﬀerent housing markets, which in our case are identiﬁed
as MSAs. This entails that we account for both structural and neighborhood characteristics in our
housing price index [ Zabel (1999) ].
3.3 Identifying the Model: The Endogeneity of Neighbors’ Housing Demand
As is clear from the housing demand equation, the endogenous social eﬀect, Πy`nyn(i), is correlated
with the error term since it includes the unobserved cluster eﬀect (v·). In this paper, we use
the average of the log of the neighbors’ housing demands, lnyn(i), as this endogenous social eﬀect.
Thus, it is necessary to instrument for lnyn(i). Using the housing demand equations for all members
of a neighborhood cluster (5) as a system to solve for lnyn(i), one can see that valid instruments
will include lnp· and the means of neighbors’ characteristics, including permanent income. To
identify the model, we need instruments that are correlated with lnyn(i) but uncorrelated with
the disturbance term, v· + ²·h. We use the link to hedonic theory (as discussed in the previous
subsection) to select appropriate instruments. In particular, we include the mean of the neighbors’
exogenous structural characteristics as instruments. Thus we estimate the following equation for
the mean of neighbors’ housing services
lnyn(i) = ¼0 + ¼1 lnp· + ¼2`nzn(i) + ¼3`nqn(i) + ´n(i); (8)
where `nzn(i) and `nqn(i) denote, respectively, the means of neighbors’ characteristics and the
means of neighboring units’ characteristics, and ´n(i) is the unobserved error term. While one
might question the validity of own structural characteristics as instruments, it should be noted
that it is the means of one’s neighbors’ structural characteristics that appear on the RHS of (8),
which does not include one’s own structural characteristics. Also, we conduct an over-identiﬁcation
test for the validity of these instruments when we carry out the empirical analysis.
124 Empirical Results
This section presents the estimation results for the housing demand function (5). We estimate our
model in four steps: one, we obtain estimates of the price of housing services, p·; two, we estimate
permanent income; three, we estimate the reduced form for the mean of the neighbors’ housing
demand; and four, we use the predicted values from step three to estimate the structural housing
demand equation (5). We discuss the implementation of this procedure and ensuing results from
these four steps in turn.
4.1 A House Price Index
As is clear from the discussion in Section 3.2, we need to estimate market prices for housing.
Recall that the clusters data in our sample come from 100 MSAs for the years 1985, 1989, and
1993. Ideally, we would like to have a price index that corresponds to the price of a “standard”
dwelling unit and comes from a diﬀerent data source that the actual data we use to estimate the
neighborhood model. We were unable to ﬁnd such a price index that covered all 100 MSAs for these
three years. To underscore this diﬃculty, consider for example the Case-Shiller index [ Case and
Shiller (1987) ]. It is available for 90 MSAs, but the use of this index results in a loss of about one
third of the data since not all MSAs covered by the Case-Shiller index are among the 100 MSAs in
our data set. Also, the Case-Shiller index would have to be made comparable across MSAs, which
would require a technique like the one we implement below.
We follow the procedure outlined in Section 3.2 and estimate the hedonic house price model
(6). We use the non-neighborhood clusters subsample of the NAHS data to estimate this model.
We do so because the non-cluster data make up approximately 90% of the NAHS data and this
results in a much larger data set. Also, this means that the prices are obtained from a diﬀerent
data set than the one that is used to estimate the housing demand equation.
The regressors in the house price hedonic, Equ. (6), include the structural characteristics of
units, qi; and neighborhood characteristics that are constant within each cluster, x·: In addition,
the regressors must account for neighbors’ property values and characteristics, Πyyn(i) and Πzzn(i);
respectively. The non-neighborhood clusters subsample of the NAHS data does not include any such
neighborhood characteristics. Therefore, we use individual characteristics of occupants to proxy
13for Πyyn(i); and Πzzn(i): We appeal to Kiel and Zabel (1998) for support of this step: they show
that when actual neighborhood characteristics are unavailable, the use of owner characteristics
is a reasonable alternative. Also Hardman and Ioannides (1998) show that the socioeconomic
characteristics of neighbors in the cluster are highly correlated.
In order to estimate the housing demand equation for each of the three years (1985, 1989, and
1993), we need to estimate a separate house price hedonic for each of these years. We also estimate
a housing demand model using the pooled data. In order for the price index to be comparable
across years, we estimate the house price hedonic using the pooled data. Given that we deﬁne each
MSA in each year to be a separate housing market, it might make sense to allow the coeﬃcients to
vary across time and space. This would lead to a large number of parameters in the model. Instead,
we restrict the coeﬃcients on all variables but the intercept to be constant. This is consistent with
Mills and Simenauer (1996) who ﬁnd very little variation in coeﬃcients over time and space when
they estimate a house price hedonic using national data from the House Financing Transaction
Database, collected by the National Association of Realtors over the period 1986-1992. We do
allow the coeﬃcients to vary over time (though not across MSAs) but this only increases the
estimated standard error of the regression by 0.05% so we use the restricted model for our analysis.
Thus, for the pooled data, the model that we estimate is
`nWijt = a0 +
J¡1 X
j=1
a0jtMSAijt + a1qit + a2x·t + azzht + uijt; (9)
i = 1;:::;Nj;j = 1;:::;J; t = 1985; 1989; 1993;
where qit includes the age of the unit and its square, the number of full baths, the number of
bedrooms and whether or not there is a garage; x·t includes a dummy variable that indicates
whether or not the unit lies in the central city of the MSA; and zht includes household income, age
of the owner, highest grade attained, and dummy variables that indicate if the owner is married,
male, Black, or Hispanic. As mentioned in Section 2, we also include length of tenure and its
square to capture the overvaluation of house prices by owners. Generally, one would like to include
such variables in x·t as school quality and crime rates, but these unfortunately are not available in
the AHS. We include the owner’s characteristics as proxies for neighborhood quality since they are
likely to be correlated with these omitted variables and hence will reduce the bias in the coeﬃcient
14estimates for the MSA dummy variables.
There are 140 potential MSAs but we require that there are at least ten observations in an MSA
in a given year for observations in that MSA to be included in the regression. This leaves 10135,
10712, and 10815 observations for 1985, 1989, and 1993, respectively. The adjusted R2s for these
regressions are 0.505, 0.586, and 0.583, respectively. As a group, the neighborhood proxies are very
signiﬁcant. These regression results are not reported here but are available from the authors upon
request. We use the estimated MSA dummies to calculate a price index for the MSA where unit i
lies, ˆ p·: For the yearly regressions, we set the price for Denver, the excluded MSA, to be 100 and
those for the other MSAs to be 100 times the antilog of the corresponding coeﬃcient estimate. For
the pooled regression, Denver in 1985 is the reference point.
From the descriptive statistics reported in Table 7, we note that the dispersion in our estimate of
housing prices, as measured by the coeﬃcient of variation, increased considerably from .30 in 1985
to .38 in 1993. This increase is not inconsistent with the observed increased regional disparities in
the dynamics of housing prices in the US over roughly that period [Poterba (1991)].
4.2 Estimating Permanent Income
It is standard practice to use permanent rather than current income in housing demand equations
[ Olsen (1987) ]. Also, it is reasonable to assume that individuals are better able to predict their
neighbors’ permanent rather than current income given the larger ﬂuctuations in the latter measure.
We deﬁne permanent income as the predicted value from the following model of (the natural log
of) current income:
`nIit = µ0 +
J¡1 X
j=1
µ0jtMSAijt + µ1cit + ºijt;
where cit includes a cubic polynomial in age and years of education, dummy variables that indicate
if the owner is married, male, Black, or Hispanic and whether or not the unit lies in the central
city of the MSA. We include the MSA dummy variables that are included in the house price
hedonic regressions (9) to capture diﬀerences in the cost-of-living across MSAs. We use the non-
neighborhood clusters subsample of the NAHS to estimate the model of income for the same
reasons that led us to use this data to estimate the price index. We estimate a separate regression
for each of the three years. The adjusted R2’s for 1985, 1989, and 1993 are 0.401, 0.374, and
150.293, respectively. Results are available from the authors on request. We then use the parameter
estimates from these regressions, along with the data from the cluster subsample to estimate the
permanent income variable that is included in the housing demand equations.
4.3 Estimating the Reduced Form for the Mean of the Neighbors’ Housing
Demand
As discussed in Section 3.3, the mean of the neighbors’ housing demands, lnyn(i); is correlated with
the disturbance term in the housing demand equation (5). Thus, we ﬁrst estimate the reduced form
equation for this variable according to Equ. (8). Table 8, column 1, reports the results for the pooled
data. The crucial variables in this regression are the mean of the neighbors’ structural characteristics
since they identify the housing demand equation. Clearly they are very signiﬁcant. The predicted
values and residuals from this regression are referred to as d `nyn(i) and d ´n(i), respectively.
We test for the endogeneity of the mean of the neighbors’ housing demand using a Hausman
test. We estimate the housing demand equation using the observed mean of the neighbors’ housing
demand and include the residual from the reduced form equation, d ´n(i), as an additional regressor.
The null hypothesis that the mean of the neighbors’ housing demand is exogenous is rejected if
the t¡statistic for d ´n(i) is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero [ Hausman (1978) ]. The p¡value for
the t¡statistic is less than 0.0001 so the null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected and the evidence
indicates that the mean of the neighbors’ housing demand is endogenous in the housing demand
equation.
4.4 Estimating the Housing Demand Equation
As a point of reference when using the pooled data, we ﬁrst estimate the standard housing demand
equation that includes the price and own characteristics as the only regressors. We include only one
observation per cluster to provide a data set that is comparable to those used in previous studies
of housing demand. The results are presented in Table 8, column 2. The price elasticity is -0.199
and it is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The income elasticity is 0.309 and also signiﬁcant. While
the price elasticity is somewhat low in magnitude, these results are generally comparable to those
16in the housing demand literature.10
As a next step, we estimate the reduced form equation for own housing demand using the pooled
data. This equation results from substituting the mean neighbors housing demand equation (8) into
the structural housing demand equation (5). This results in the means of the neighbors’ socioeco-
nomic and house characteristics becoming additional regressors. While the neighbors’ consumption
is obviously absent from this reduced form regression, the results are interesting in their own right,
as they may be given a more limited interpretation of housing demand with neighborhood eﬀects.
That is, signiﬁcant presence of contextual eﬀects is evidence of neighborhood eﬀects, even if en-
dogenous eﬀects may not be identiﬁed separately. The result is reported in Table 8, column 3.
As a group, both the neighbors’ socioeconomic characteristics and house characteristics are very
signiﬁcant. The former result is evidence of neighborhood eﬀects, although it does not distinguish
endogenous and/or contextual social eﬀects, per se. As a group, the neighborhood eﬀects are very
important in explaining housing demand. The percentage of the explained sum of squares that is
attributable to the neighborhood eﬀects is 65.5. Note that the price elasticity is now large (relative
to the estimate from the standard housing demand equation in Table 8, column 2) in magnitude,
¡0:427; and highly signiﬁcant. The income elasticity is small, 0.119, but signiﬁcant.
Finally, we estimate the structural housing demand equation (5). We include the predicted
value from the reduced form regression for the mean neighbors’ housing demand (d `nyn(i)). This
allows us to identify the endogenous neighborhood eﬀect. The means of the following neighbors’
characteristics are treated as contextual neighborhood eﬀects: household income and whether the
owner is white, is married, graduated from high school, and whether moved into the house in the
last ﬁve years. Excluded from the housing demand regressions are the means of the structural
characteristics of the neighbors’ units.
We estimate a log-linear housing demand model using cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀects. The
results are reported in Table 9. We provide results for each year of the three waves, 1985, 1989,
and 1993. The coeﬃcient estimates are quite stable over this period so we also provide the results
for the pooled sample. While the test for parameter constancy is rejected (F-statistic= 2.4, p-value
10The study that is closest to this empirical example is Goodman (1988). He estimates a model of tenure choice
and housing demand using the 1978 NAHS. The price and income elasticities are approximately -0.5 and 0.25,
respectively.
17= 0.00004), the percent increase in the residual sum of squares by imposing the restrictions is only
0.94%. Thus we focus our discussion, in the remainder of the section, on the results for the pooled
model.11 The price elasticity, ¡0:244; is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 1%. The elasticity of
own permanent income is 0.119 and is highly signiﬁcant. The estimate of the price elasticity is
comparable to that of the standard housing demand model (-0.199) but the income elasticity has
decreased considerably (was 0.309). The remaining own characteristics are not signiﬁcant in this
regression, neither individually nor as a group.
The elasticity of housing demand with respect to the mean of the neighbors’ housing demands
is 0.660 and it is highly signiﬁcant. This is evidence of a strong endogenous social eﬀect. This result
is in broad agreement with the ﬁnding by Ioannides (2001a) of an eﬀect of maintenance by one’s
neighbors on own maintenance of 0.487. The means of neighbors’ socioeconomic characteristics
are jointly signiﬁcant at the 3% level. Thus, this is weaker evidence of contextual eﬀects. The
only variable that is individually signiﬁcant is the mean of neighbors’ permanent incomes. The
elasticity with respect to neighbors’ permanent income is 0.175. One interpretation of this eﬀect
is that individuals see their neighbors’ permanent income as an indication of their “permanent”
housing consumption. Thus, a rise in the neighbors’ permanent income would signal a rise in their
future housing consumption which individuals anticipate by increasing their own current housing
demand. It is somewhat surprising that this eﬀect is larger than that of the owner’s permanent
income.
We test for the validity of the identifying instruments, that is the means of the neighbors’
structural characteristics, using the, by now, standard test for overidentifying restrictions [see, for
example, Wooldridge (2000)]. This test is carried out by ﬁrst estimating the housing demand
equation using only one of the mean neighbors’ structural characteristics, so that the model is just
identiﬁed. Let this variable be denoted q1. The residuals from this regression are then regressed
on all the exogenous variables, including the remaining mean neighbors’ structural characteristics.
The test of the null hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance term from
11Since the predicted, rather than the actual, value of the mean of neighbors’ demand is included in the housing
demand equation, it is necessary to adjust the standard errors for the random eﬀects estimator. In this case, this
results in a small change in the standard errors. The ratio of the adjusted standard error to the unadjusted standard
error is 1.060, 1.061, 1.059, and 1.062 for the random eﬀects regressions for 1985, 1989, 1993, and the pooled sample,
respectively. Appendix A clariﬁes the steps involved in the necessary correction.
18the structural equation is rejected if the test statistic (n¢R2) is greater than the critical value Â2
c
where c is the number of overidentifying instruments (in this case c=4). The R2 from this regression
is 0.0003 and the test statistic has a p-value of 0.684. Thus the null hypothesis is not rejected and
the mean neighbors’ structural characteristics appear to be valid identifying instruments.
Note that it is necessary to assume that q1; the one instrument that is used to just identify the
housing demand equation, is exogenous in order to carry out the overidentiﬁcation test. Thus,
the fact that the mean of the neighbors’ structural characteristics pass the overidentiﬁcation test,
does not totally conﬁrm their validity as instruments. Recall that we have not accounted for
residential choice in this model, so the error term might include neighbors’ common (unobservable)
characteristics that led them to choose the same location that might be correlated with the mean
of the structural characteristics in the cluster. Because of such model uncertainty, we tried using
a diﬀerent, but related, set of instruments to compare results. Rather than using the means of
the neighbors’ structural characteristics, we use instead the structural characteristics for only one
of each individual’s (randomly chosen) neighbors in the cluster. An argument in favor of this
choice is that the structural characteristics of one neighbor are less likely to be representative of
the neighborhood than the mean of all the neighbors in the cluster, and hence will be more likely
to be uncorrelated (or, at least, less correlated) with the unobserved cluster component of the
error term in the housing demand equation. A drawback of using these instruments is that to the
extent that the mean is a valid instrument, the use of only one neighbor’s structural characteristics
will lead to a less eﬃcient estimator. Another drawback is the arbitrary nature of choosing as
instruments a particular neighbor’s structural characteristics (versus those of some other resident in
the neighborhood). To deal with this latter problem, we carried out this exercise four times (using
four diﬀerent sets of neighbor’s structural characteristics). We expected and did get approximately
the same result each time.
In order to estimate the housing demand equation using the alternative sets of instruments,
we must ﬁrst estimate the reduced form equation for the mean of the neighbors’ housing demand.
The R2s for the four regressions range from 0.226 to 0.243. These are substantially less than the
R2 for the reduced form equation when the means of the neighbors’ structural characteristics are
used (0.517). Next, we use the predicted values from these regressions to estimate the housing
19demand equation. As expected, the results for the four cases are quite similar. We present the
results for a representative case in Column 5 of Table 9. This set of instruments also passes the
test of overidentifying restrictions. We refrain from reporting details for reasons of brevity.
There are some important diﬀerences between these results and the ones presented earlier which
use the means of the neighbors’ structural characteristics as instruments. First, the endogenous
eﬀect has fallen from 0.660 to 0.188 (the range is 0.150 to 0.210) though it is still signiﬁcant.
Second, the coeﬃcient on the mean of (the log of) neighbors’ income has increased from 0.175 to
0.539 (the range is 0.520 to 0.570). Third, three of the ﬁve coeﬃcients on the other means of the
neighbors’ characteristics are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. As compared to the results based on
the means of the neighboring units’ structural characteristics, using only one of neighboring unit’s
structural characteristics as instruments results in a much larger portion of the neighborhood eﬀects
being accounted for by the contextual eﬀect than by the endogenous eﬀect. Still, the endogenous
eﬀect remains a signiﬁcant factor in this latter case.
The conclusion to be drawn from this exercise is that both endogenous and contextual eﬀects
are present in the housing demand model though which one dominates is not clear. Also, the
fact that the two sets of instruments produce such diﬀerent results indicates that they may well
be correlated with unobservables in the structural equation. As mentioned above, one source of
such unobservables is the fact that we have not accounted for residential choice. In view of the
considerable model uncertainty aﬀecting our model, we feel more comfortable presenting both set
of results, which provide a range of possibilities.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate a model of housing demand with neighborhood eﬀects. Neighborhood
eﬀects produce a high degree of interdependence among neighbors’s demands. We exploit special
features of the National sample of the American Housing Survey and properties of housing markets
that allow us to create natural instruments that allow us to estimate the model. We believe that
we are the ﬁrst researchers to estimate such a model. We ﬁnd evidence of both endogenous and
contextual neighborhood eﬀects. The endogenous eﬀect implies that individual housing demand is
aﬀected by the mean housing demand of one’s neighbors. This is consistent with the concept of
20“keeping up with Joneses” which manifests itself in individual maintenance, repair, addition, and
renovation decisions. That is, neighbors’ decisions to maintain, repair, renovate, or make additions
to their homes induce individuals to keep up by increasing their own housing consumption. The
contextual eﬀect implies that individual housing demand is inﬂuenced by the neighbors’ charac-
teristics. This could be a pure preference eﬀect. Alternatively, it could be rationalized as owners’
viewing their neighbors’ characteristics, e.g. income, as signals of their future housing consumption
which leads them to alter their own consumption accordingly.
A diﬃcult aspect of models with social eﬀects is identifying the endogenous and contextual
eﬀects. We attempt to identify these eﬀects using as instruments the means of the structural char-
acteristics of the dwelling units occupied by neighbors. We claim that these variables are correlated
with the endogenous variable (the mean of the neighbors’ housing demand) but uncorrelated with
the error term in the own structural housing demand equation. One justiﬁcation for this latter
claim is that these means include only the neighbors’ structural characteristics. In fact, when we
use the own structural characteristics as instruments, the over-identiﬁcation test is rejected. We
also try another set of instruments that include the structural characteristics for the dwelling unit
occupied by only one neighbor. Given that they are less representative of the neighborhood than
the means of all neighbors’ structural characteristics, these instruments may well be less correlated
with the unobserved cluster eﬀect in the structural own housing demand equation. The two sets
of instruments provide a range of signiﬁcant estimates for the endogenous and contextual eﬀects.
When the endogenous neighborhood eﬀect is large the respective contextual eﬀects are weak, and
vice versa.
One factor that we have not accounted for in our model is residential choice. Ignoring residential
choice can lead to a form of sample selection bias. For example, Rapaport (1997) shows that
accounting for community choice in a model of housing demand can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the estimated
price elasticity. The data that we have used for this analysis do not allow us to account for
residential choice since they contain very limited information about the location of houses within
the MSA. By gaining access to the US Bureau of the Census’ own (but conﬁdential) version of
the NAHS, we plan to extend our model to include neighborhood choice. Not only will this allow
us to alleviate the potential sample selection bias, but it also provides additional instruments for
21identifying the endogenous and contextual eﬀects [ Brock and Durlauf (2000) ].
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25APPENDIX A:
Calculation of the standard errors for the random eﬀects estimator of the housing
demand model with neighborhood eﬀects
In this appendix, we show how the standard errors for the random eﬀects estimator of the
housing demand model (5) with neighborhood eﬀects must be adjusted. This adjustment is similar
to the one associated with the instrumental variables estimator and is dictated by the fact that we
instrument for the endogenous neighborhood eﬀect on the RHS of (5).
For this analysis, the endogenous neighborhood eﬀect is the mean of the log of neighbors’
housing demand, `nyn(i). As deﬁned in the text, d `nyn(i) and d ´n(i), are the predicted values and
the residuals from the reduced form regression for the mean of the log of neighbors’ housing demand
(equation 8). Thus
`nyn(i) = d `nyn(i) + d ´n(i):
By substituting into the demand Equ. (5), we have
`nyi·h = ® + ¹`np· + »`nzh + ±`nIh + ¯
µ
d `nyn(i) + d ´n(i)
¶
+ °`nzn(i) + À· + ²·h;
= ® + ¹`np· + »`nzh + ±`nIh + ¯d `nyn(i) + °`nzn(i) + À· + ²·h + ¯ d ´n(i);
where `nzn(i) stands for Πz`nzn(i): Estimating this model by random eﬀects results in an estimator










where N is the number of clusters, n· is the number of units in cluster ·; DF is the degrees of
freedom in the housing demand equation, and r·h is the residual from the random eﬀects regression.
This will lead to the wrong standard errors because of the fact that the predicted rather than the
actual mean of the log of housing demand is included on the RHS of the housing demand equation.
It is possible to ﬁx the standard errors for this estimator by following the approach taken in the
standard instrumental variables estimator case. That is, the corrected standard error is calculated












i· = ri· ¡ ˆ ¯( d ´n(i) ¡ ˆ µ· d ´n(i));
and





² + n·ˆ ¾2
À
;
and d ´n(i) is the cluster mean of d ´n(i).
One other issue is that ˆ µ· will also be incorrect because it depends on ˆ ¾2
²; the estimated regression
variance from the ﬁxed eﬀects model, which in turn is aﬀected by the fact that the predicted rather
than the actual value of the mean housing demand is included in the housing demand equation.
But this impact should be minor and can probably be ignored. This follows from the fact that
the mean of the log of housing demand among one’s neighbors is nearly constant across the units
that make up the cluster. That is, the ﬁxed eﬀects residuals must be corrected by subtracting out
¯
d ´n(i)¡d ´n(i)
n· : This adjustment should make a small diﬀerence, particularly given the division by n·
and hence it should make little diﬀerence in calculating ˆ ¾2
²:
27Table 1: Neighborhood Cluster Counts: A
Clusters Present Only in 1985 6
Clusters Present Only in 1985 and 1989 14
Clusters Present Only in 1985 and 1993 9
Clusters Present in 1985, 1989, and 1993 196
Total Clusters in 1985 225
Clusters Present Only in 1989 10
Clusters Present Only in 1989 and 1985 14
Clusters Present Only in 1989 and 1993 45
Clusters Present in 1985, 1989, and 1993 196
Total Clusters in 1989 265
Clusters Present Only in 1993 85
Clusters Present Only in 1993 and 1985 9
Clusters Present Only in 1993 and 1989 45
Clusters Present in 1985, 1989, and 1993 196
Total Clusters in 1993 335
Table 2: Neighborhood Cluster Counts: B
1985 1989 1993 Total
Clusters Present in Only One Year 6 10 85 101
1985/1989 1985/1993 1989/1993 Total
Clusters Present in Two Years 14 9 45 68
Clusters Present in All Three Years 196
Total Number of Clusters 365
Table 6: DEFINITIONS OF REGRESSION VARIABLES
28Table 3: Neighborhood Frequency Counts
Total Units in Cluster Total Owner-Occupied Houses in Cluster
Number in Cluster Clusters Frequency of Number of Clusters Clusters Frequency of Number of Clusters
6 2 0.55 54 14.79
7 10 2.74 55 15.07
8 29 7.95 69 18.90
9 53 14.52 67 18.36
10 107 29.32 59 16.16
11 141 38.63 58 15.89
12 19 5.21 2 0.55
13 3 0.82 1 0.27
14 1 0.27
Table 4: Neighborhood Unit Counts: A
Houses Present Only in 1985 133
Houses Present Only in 1985 and 1989 224
Houses Present Only in 1985 and 1993 142
Houses Present in 1985, 1989, and 1993 1448
Total Houses in 1985 1947
Houses Present Only in 1989 153
Houses Present Only in 1989 and 1985 224
Houses Present Only in 1989 and 1993 493
Houses Present in 1985, 1989, and 1993 1448
Total Houses in 1989 2318
Houses Present Only in 1993 826
Houses Present Only in 1993 and 1985 142
Houses Present Only in 1993 and 1989 493
Houses Present in 1985, 1989, and 1993 1448
Total Houses in 1993 2909
Table 5: Neighborhood Unit Counts: B
1985 1989 1993 Total
Units Present in Only One Year 133 153 826 1112
1985/1989 1985/1993 1989/1993 Total
Units Present in Two Years 224 142 493 859
Units Present in All Three Years 1448
Total Number of Units 3379
29HOUSING DEMAND VARIABLES
LNHDEM natural log of housing demand
PRICE House price index obtained from the hedonic regression
LNINCOME Natural log of household income
LNPINCOME Natural log of permanent household income
HIGH SCHOOL =1 if owner graduated from high school, =0 otherwise
WHITE = 1 if owner is white, =0 otherwise
NPERSONS Number of persons in the household
MARRIED = 1 if owner is married, = 0 otherwise
CHANGED HANDS = 1 if house changed hands in last ﬁve years, = 0 otherwise
LNHDEMM Cluster mean of LNHDEM
LNINCOMEM Cluster mean of LNINCOME
LNPINCOMEM Cluster mean of LNPINCOME
HIGH SCHOOLM Cluster mean of HIGH SCHOOL
WHITEM Cluster mean of WHITE
NPERSONSM Cluster mean of NPERSONS
MARRIEDM Cluster mean of MARRIED
CHANGEHANDM Cluster mean of CHANGEHAND
Dummy89 Dummy89 = 1 if 1989 obs, = 0, otherwise
Dummy93 Dummy93 = 1 if 1993 obs, = 0, otherwise
HOUSE PRICE HEDONIC EQUATION VARIABLES
LNVALUE Natural log of owner-estimated value of the house
CENCITY =1 if house in central city of SMSA, =0 otherwise
HAGE the age of the house in years
HAGESQ square of HAGE
GARAGE =1 if the house has a garage, =0 otherwise
30BEDROOMS number of bedrooms in the house
FULLBATHS number of full bathrooms in the house
TENURE years that owner has lived in house
GRADE Highest grade attained by owner
MALE =1 if owner is male, = 0 otherwise
HISP =1 if owner is Hispanic, = 0 otherwise
HAGEM Cluster mean of HAGE
HAGESQM Cluster mean of HAGESQ
GARAGEM Cluster mean of GARAGE
BEDROOMSM Cluster mean of BEDROOMS
FULLBATHSM Cluster mean of FULLBATHS
31Table 7: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR REGRESSION
VARIABLES
Variable 1985 1989 1993 POOLED
VALUE/1,000 93.56 138.10 133.27 124.06
55.89 94.23 85.23 83.73
PRICE 82.11 122.57 119.03 105.11
24.92 51.67 45.46 43.80
INCOME/1,000 40.52 47.79 51.40 47.28
28.10 34.83 37.23 34.46
HIGH SCHOOL 0.836 0.860 0.870 0.858
0.37 0.35 0.34 0.35
CHANGED HANDS 0.289 0.317 0.278 0.294
0.45 0.47 0.45 0.46
WHITE 0.879 0.866 0.848 0.862
0.325 0.341 0.359 0.344
NPERSONSM 2.851 2.768 2.738 2.779
1.439 1.470 1.436 1.448
MARRIED 0.713 0.654 0.645 0.666
0.452 0.476 0.479 0.472
Observations 1947 2318 2909 7174
32Table 8: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR LOG-DEMAND EQUATION :
Reduced Forms for Pooled Data
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variable Mean of Neighbors’ Standard Housing Demand - Housing Demand
Housing Demand No Neighborhood Eﬀects Reduced Form




HIGH SCHOOL .057 .003
(.060) (.016)








Dummy89 -.127** -.081 -.129**
(.010) (.049) (.031)




HIGH SCHOOLM .108** .134
(.026) (.071)
33Table 8: CONTINUED
Variable Mean of Neighbors’ Standard Housing Demand - Housing Demand
Housing Demand No Neighborhood Eﬀects Reduced Form


















CONSTANT 2.107** 4.401** 2.285**
(.131) (.334) (.362)
Observations 7174 7174 7174
R-SQUARE: WITHIN .001
R-SQUARE: BETWEEN .588
R-SQUARE: OVERALL ..617 .133 .411
S.D. of RE .307
S.D. Regression error .279 .307
Per cent of variance due to RE .427
Note: *, ** indicate signiﬁcant at the 5, 1 percent signiﬁcance levels.
34Table 9
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR LOG-DEMAND EQUATION:
Cluster Variables Included
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variable 1985 1989 1993 POOLED POOLED–alt.instr
LNHDEMM .710** .737** .621** .660** .189**
(.078) (.074) (.072) (.047) (.037)
LNPRICE -.230 -.160 -.281* -.244* -.584**
(.145) (.133) (.129) (.079) (.081)
LNPINCOME .136** .084** .140** 119** .148**
(.026) (.024) (.022) (.014) (.015)
HIGH SCHOOL -.028 .037 -.002 .004 .009
(.026) (.027) (.024) (.015) (.016)
CHANGED HANDS .032 .038 -.025 .014 .009
(.017) (.018) (.015) (.010) (.010)
WHITE .077* .008 -.009 .015 .006
(.030) (.029) (.022) (.015) (.017)
NUMBER PERSONS -.004 .003 .010 .004 .003
(.006) (.006) ( .006) (.004) (.004)
MARRIED -.005 .028 -.006 .010 .018
(.023) ( .022) (.019) (.012) (.013)
LNPINCOMEM .146 .128 .191 .175* .539**
(.124) (.117) (.113) (.071) (.071)
HIGH SCHOOLM .039 .064 .053 .062 .157*
(.110) (.118) (.113) (.067) (.071)
CHANGED HANDSM -.005 -.047 -.069 -.032 -.061
( .064) (.077) (.079) (.043) (.046)
Note: *, ** indicate signiﬁcant at the 5, 1 percent signiﬁcance levels.
35Table 9: CONTINUED
WHITEM -.075 .008 .071 .019 .078
(.069) ( .068) (.061) (.038) (.041)
NUMBER PERSONM -.038 -.018 -.008 -.023 -.044*
(.029) (.028) (.026) (.016) (.017)
MARRIEDM .041 .037 .058 .054 .144*





CONSTANT .228 .176 .278 .381 1.018**
(.576) (.564) (.529) ( .316) (.340)
Observations 1947 2318 2909 7174 7174
R-SQUARE: WITHIN .0006 .0005 .0011 .0003 .0072
R-SQUARE: BETWEEN .6150 .6165 .5914 .5921 .4584
R-SQUARE: OVERALL .4273 .4293 .4166 .4136 .3280
S.D of RE .2393 .2740 .2675 .2644 .2653
S.D. Regression Error .2888 .3291 .3033 .3075 ????
Per cent Variance due to RE .4081 .4094 .4376 .4250 .4194
Per cent explained Variation due to Cluster vars
P-Value for cluster vars .6678 .8180 .2326 .0279 .001
36